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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a consolidated appeal from a criminal conviction and post-conviction proceedings. 
Clerk's Record (CR) Vol. IV 732. 
B. Procedural and Factual History 
Appellant Faron Stone was charged by information with two counts of aggravated battery 
upoil a law enforcement officer, I.C. 5 5  18-903, 18-907(1)(a) and 18-915, one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, I.C. 5 27-2732( c)(l), and one count of 
unlawful possessioil of a firearm, LC. 5 18-3316. CR Vol. 11 338. Part I1 of the information 
alleged use of a firearm in commission ofthe offense. CR Vol. 11 341. And, Part III of the 
information alleged that Mr. Stone was a persistent violator. CR Vol. 11 342. 
The charges arose out of an attempt by the Chubbuck Police to serve a no-knock 
daylnight warrant at approximately 1:42 am on March 7, 2005, on a single-wide trailer occupied 
by Mr. Stone, his companion Maria Villa, and Ms. Villa's two children, a son, age 3 years, and a 
daughter, age 8 months. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, Exhibit on Appeal, 
p. I,  35, CR Vol. I1 208. 
Maria Villa told the Idaho State Police that she and her children lived with Mr. Stone in 
the trailer. She and Mr. Stone used methamphetamine together. About a month and a half prior 
to the service of the search warrant, she got into a fight with Jose Gonzales and Jose told her that 
he was going to shoot her in front of her children. She had seen him with a 91nm handgun in the 
past and was afraid for her safety. CR Vol. 11 231. 
I A couple of weeks after the fight, she bought two handguns to protect herself. About that 
same time, family members told her that the police were watching her home. CR Vol. I1 23 1. 
On May 7, 2006, about 1:30 am, Ms. Villa and Mr. Stone retuined home and placed the 
children in bed. A short time later they heard voices outside and Mr. Stone left the bedroom to 
see who was outside. As Mr. Stone left the bedroom, Ms. Villa heard a loud explosion inside the 
trailer. Mr. Stone came running back into the bedroom and grabbed one of the guns from the 
dresser. At no time did Ms. Villa hear anyone say that they were with the police or that a search 
warrant was being served. CR Vol. II 23 1. 
Ijarley Merica was on the Chubbuck Police team as a breacher and team entry member. 
According to his interview with the Idaho State Police, upon the command of Sergeant Frasure to 
initiate the search, he fired two TKO door-breaching rounds from his Remiilgton 870 shotgun at 
the front door of the trailer "disabling the locking mechanism." He then stepped out of the way, 
and Officer Gilbert placed a "noise flash diversion device" inside the door.' CR Vol. 1 198. 
Martin Frasure, the Special Team leader, told the Idaho State Police interviewer that he 
heard Officer Galloway announce their presence over a PA, at which time Officer May placed a 
flash noise diversionary device in the backyard of the trailer. Officer Merica then shot two door- 
breachiilg rounds into the front door and Officer Gilbert placed another flash noise diversionary 
device inside the front door. Then, gunfire erupted. CR Vol. I1 216. 
Paul Gilbert, a patrol officer with the Chubbuck Police Department, told the Idaho State 
Police that he participated in serving the search warrant while armed with a Glock .40 caliber 
' At the preliminary hearing, Martin Frasure, the Special Team leader, testified that a 
noise flash diversion device causes a loud bang with an extremely bright white flash. The intent 
is to disorient a person long enough for the police to get a time and surprise advantage over him. 
Tr. Preliminary Ilearing p. 19. 
handgun. He heard Officer Galloway announce "Chubbuck Police" over the PA and saw Officer 
Merica fire two door-breaching rounds at the trailer. He also saw Officer Merica place a flash 
noise device inside the trailer. Officer Gilbert entered the trailer and saw a revolver pointing 
toward the front door and firing. He fired his Glock four to five times, reloaded, and left. CR 
Vol. II220. 
Officer Adam Anderson of the Chubbuck Police told the Idaho State Police that he also 
assisted in serving the search warrant. According to him, he saw Officer Ballard go onto the 
back step of the trailer and prepare to breach the door. He then saw a curtain inside the trailer 
move as if someone had walked by it. Sergeant Frasure gave the signal to go and Officer May 
deployed a noise flash diversionary device at the same time as Officer Galloway announced 
"Chubbuck Police" over the PA. He and Officer Ballard began breaching the back door as he 
heard Officer Merica breach the front door. He thought he heard two officers at the front door 
announce "police warrant service." Then he heard gunshots being fired and he thought Officer 
Ballard might have been hit. He sought cover below the skirting of the trailer. CR Vol. 11 224- 
225. 
Officer Phillip Hill told the Idaho State Police that he was an entry team member on the 
Special Response Teain. He did not tell the ISP that he ever heard the police announce 
themselves. He pushed his way through the door to the trailer and once inside he was shot three 
times in the buttock and lower back. He immediately turned and went back toward the front 
porch where he fired three to four rounds from his submachine gun toward the threat in the 
trailer. CR Vol. I1 228. 
Dana May, a Chubbuck patrol officer, was assigned to carry a fire extinguisher and a 
noise flash diversionary device to be deployed at the back ofthe trailer. He heard Sergeant 
Frasure say "go" o'n the radio and he threw the noise flash device at the back of the trailer. He 
heard Officer Galloway aimounce their presence on the bullhorn and heard another bang up front. 
Then, he heard what he believed were seven shots being fired. He did not hear any officers in the 
front ofthe trailer announce their presence. CR Vol. I1 237. 
Officer Mike Ballard of the Chubbuck Police Department told the Idaho State Police that 
he was to breach and hold the back door of the trailer along with Officer Anderson. They had a 
ram and a halogen tool. As soon as Sergeant Frasure gave the go signal, Officer May threw the 
noise flash diversionary device. Then Officer Ballard tried unsuccessfully to breach the back 
door. While he was doing that, he could hear Officer Galloway on the bullhorn announcing their 
presence and the search warrant. Having failed to breach the door, Officer Ballard broke a 
window. As soon as he did that he felt something hit him and knock him back. He could hear 
officers inside saying "police warrant service" or something to that effect. He heard a lot of 
gunfire and a hole appeared in the side of the trailer. He stepped off the steps and could hear 
bullets coining through the wall and door area. He had someone check him and it was reported 
that he had beell shot in the shoulder. He went to where an ambulance was staged and was taken 
to a medical center. He had been hit in the upper chest area. CR Vol. I1 240-241. 
When Ms. Villa heard gunshots being fired, she fell to the floor by the bed. After several 
shots were fired, all shooting stopped and Mr. Stone came back into the bedroom. She jumped 
up to check on the children. Mr. Stone went to look outside to see if he could see who had been 
around the trailer. When Mr. Stone came back into the bedroom, he said he believed the people 
in the trailer had been the police because they had left their equipment behind. She and Mr. 
Stone then grabbed the children and the guns a id  fled the area. No one tried to stop them. CR 
Vol. 11 232. 
They drove around for a bit and stayed with various people. She left the children with 
one friend. Finally, they realized that the police were near to where they were staying and they 
peacefully surrendered. CR Vol. 11 232-233. 
Many neighbors in the trailer park were interviewed by police. Lori-Crowder Heath, who 
hved two spaces east of Mr. Stone stated that she was awakened by the sound of a loud blast 
followed by gunfire. She did not hear any announcement from the police or shouting prior to the 
blast. CR Vol. I1 21 1. 
Arlene Mitani was awalte sitting in the front room of her trailer across the street and to 
I 
the north of Mr. Stone's home. She heard a gunshot followed by someone either yelling 
"Chuhbuck Police" or "Call the police." She did not report any yelling before the initial 
shooting. After the yelling, she heard more shooting. CR Vol. II 21 1-212. 
Sheila Frasure was asleep in her trailer across the street and to the southwest of Mr. 
Stone's home. She was awakened by the sound of gunfire, but she did not hear any yelling prior 
to the shooting. CR Vol. II 212. 
Brian Price was awake in his trailer across the street and to the west of Mr. Stone's home. 
He heard yelling and then gunfire, but he could not tell what words were being yelled. CR Vol. 
11 213. 
Counsel was appointed and several motions filed, including a suppression motion. CR 
Vol. I1 353-423, Vol. 111 426-474. The suppression motion alleged that the daylnight no-knock 
warrant was based upon false information andor upon reckless disregard for the truth. In 
particular: 1) the affidavit supporting the warrant overstated, exaggerated, or was so vague as to 
be misleading with regard to the affiant's qualifications and experience; 2) the information 
supporting the affidavit came from a person who wanted Mr. Stone evicted from the trailer and 
was supplied on March 7,8,  and 15, of 2005, and the search did not take place until May 7,2005, 
thus it was both unreliable and stale; 3) the affiant failed to state that children lived in the trailer, 
even though he knew this to be the case;' 4) the garbage was searched on May 3,2005, hut the 
search did not take place until May 7,2005; and 5) none of the information in the affidavit was 
from the direct ltnowledge of the affiant and was based upon insinuations and exaggerations. CR 
Vol. I11 432. 
However, the case was ultimately resolved by a plea agreement. Mr. Stone pled guilty to 
one count of aggravated battery upon a police officer and one count of unlawful possession of a 
firearm. The remaining charges and Parts I1 and 111 of the information were dismissed. 
Additionally, it was agreed that the State would recommend a unified sentence of 15 years with 
7.5 years fixed and would not initiate any affirmative action with regard to any charges being 
brought by the federal govenment. The plea agreement was not binding on the District Court. 
CR Vol. 111 484,487. 
Just two months later, prior to sentencing, Mr. Stone filed apro  se motion to withdraw 
his plea, stating that there was just cause to allow withdrawal as he was not allowed time to 
consider the plea agreement, counsel did not explain the non-binding nature of the agreement, 
and counsel engaged in overreaching to obtain his acquiescence in the plea agreement. CR Vol. 
In fact, the police knew that children were in the trailer when they served the search 
warrant because, according to Officer Ballard, they had seen the children going into the trailer 
just before they breached the door. PSI p. 27. 
II1490. In particular, Mr. Stone pointed out that he had understood that the State's sentencing 
recommendation would be binding upon the Court, he did not understand that his plea could not 
be revoked, he was given just 48 hours to consider the plea agreement, he felt extreme pressure 
from his attorneys to accept the agreement, and his attorneys were not totally forthcoming with 
all the information he needed to make an informed decision about entering a plea. CR Vol. III 
Trial counsel then moved to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest in their continued 
representation of Mr. Stone. CR Vol. III 497. The Court granted this motion, appointed new 
counsel, and ordered that a transcript of the guilty plea hearing be prepared. CR Vol. I11 501. 
New counsel then filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the following grounds: 
1) ineffective assistance by prior counsel; 
2) misrepresentations by prior counsel regarding evidence implicating Mr. Stone 
in the charged offenses - specifically, counsel told Mr. Stone that the police had - . 
recovered a gun purportedly used by him in the offense when in fact the gun had 
not been recovered; 
3) prior counsel failed to seek Mr. Stone's pre-trial release, which would have 
allowed counsel's investigator to undertake an investigation which would prove 
that the officers were not injured by bullets fired from the handgun allegedly used 
by Mr. Stone; 
4) prior counsel failed to pursue a defense based upon the fact that no slugs from 
the gun allegedly used by Mr. Stone, nor the gun itself, were ever recovered, 
making it impossible for the State to prove Mr. Stone's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
5) prior counsel failed to either tell Mr. Stone of these possible defenses or 
investigate these possible defenses prior to entry of the guilty plea; 
6) Mr. Stone did not learn of his potential defenses until after he had entered the 
guilty plea; 
7) there were discrepancies in the evidence about whether the police identified 
themselves as police prior to entering Mr. Stone's home and firing their weapons, 
and Mr. Stone did not know that the intruders were police at the time he shot in 
self-defense, and this would be a defense to the criille of aggravated battery upon a 
law enforcement officer; 
8) prior counsel did not raise or explain this possible defense to Mr. Stone, 
leading him to make a unknowing and involuntary plea; 
9) evidence existed to establish that Mr. Stone thought that the person who was 
firing into his home was Jose Speedy, a man Mr. Stone knew to be armed and 
dangerous, however, prior counsel did not inform him that his belief that the 
person he shot at was someone other than a police officer could be a defense to 
the crime of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, leading him to make 
a plea that was not knowing and voluntary; 
10) prior counsel did not sufficiently and adequately investigate the issue of self- 
defense, resulting in Mr. Stone entering a plea that was not knowing and 
voluntary; 
11) prior counsel failed to fully investigate evidence indicating that the co- 
defendant fired the shots which hit the police officers; 
12) Mr. Stone's plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was made without 
counsel having investigated evidence that the officers were actually hit by the co- 
defendant's shots rather than shots fired by Mr. Stone; 
13) prior counsel failed to investigate the defense that Mr. Stone could not have 
fired the shots which injured the police as the gun he allegedly used held only five 
rounds, five rounds were fired into the wall, and there was not time for him to 
have reloaded, and his guilty plea was not ltnowing and voluntary as it was 
entered without investigation into this defense; 
14) prior counsel failed to secure independent forensic testing of the handgun and 
the rounds recovered: 
15) prior counsel did not investigate the law, regulations, and protocol governing 
the use of deadly weapons and other firearms when the police enter a home, thus 
preventing Mr. Stone from raising potential defenses based upon the violation of 
these laws and rules; 
16) prior coullsel did not investigate, the law, regulations, and protocol governing 
the use of deadly weapons and other firearms when entering homes where the 
police have notice that infants and children are present, thus preventing Mr. Stone 
froin raising potential defenses based upon the violation of those laws and rules; 
17) prior couilsel failed to investigate the potential for collusion between the two 
injured officers who were represented by the same attorney at their individual 
interviews after the event; 
18) prior counsel coerced and forced Mr. Stone to enter a guilty plea; 
19) prior counsel misled Mr. Stone to believe that ifthe judge declined to follow 
the State's sentencing recommendation, he would be allowed to withdraw his 
plea; 
20) Mr. Stone was not able to enter a voluntary and knowing plea because at the 
time the plea was entered he was suffering from psychological instability as a 
result of having been placed in lock-down and segregation at the Bannock County 
Jail: and 
21) prior counsel never explored a defense based upon the fact that Mr. Stone was 
never identified at the scene of the shooting. 
Based upon these reasons and the 5"', 6Ih, and 14" Amendments, and Article 13 of the Idaho 
I 
I 
Constitution, Mr. Stone asked that the District Court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. CR 
Vol. 111 513. 
The District Court heard and denied the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea just prior 
to sentencing. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 17. In its oral comments, the Court focused on the fact that Mr. 
Stone had been thoroughly questioned at the plea hearing and had been clear that he wanted to 
enter the plea. For example, the Court stated: 
I was talking lo him about every bit of this kind of stuff. Every last bit of it. 
Asking him if he had any problems with his attorney. Asking him if he had any 
problem with what he understood the evidence to be. Asking him every one of 
these questions. Telling him I don't want you to plead. I'd rather you go to trial. 
Please don't plead. He every time said, no. I know exactly where I anl, know 
exactly what I'm doing, know exactly what the situation is. 
Tr. 10/19106 p. 22. 
With regard to the standard of review, the following transpired: 
Court: What's the standard of review? 
Mr. Reynolds [defense counsel]: I would believe it would probably be deference 
to the Court's taking of the plea. I think that probably would be based on the fact 
that the Court was present to observe the defendant's demeanor, his responses, to 
inquire of counsel, to perceive counsel's demeanor, the State's representative, its 
demeanor, to take and make an assessment based on the information presented at 
that time. 
Court: And determine whether someone, based on all the facts, all the situation as 
it existed at the point, made a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your I-Ionor. 
Court: Asking the defendant all of the questions necessary to make sure about that 
and making sure that that's where the defendant was. 
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your Honor. 
Tr. 10119106 p. 23 
Later, the Court made further comments about the standard of review: 
Court: And frankly, I think this procedure is a lot more like a plea after sentence 
than it is a plea before. Because this defendant did not come into this courtroom 
not knowing a thing about what I was going to do. He tried to get me to bind 
myself to 7 and a half and 7 and a half and I said no, I'm not doing it. And then 
he tries after knowing that, he enters his plea and then he tries to withdraw his 
plea. 
So I think this is a little bit different even than the regular plea. And I think the 
standard of review even gets different. And I think this defendant and this record 
has to be - has to be right on with what happened and that's why his plea was 
taken like this. 
Tr. 10119106 p. 26-27. 
Defense counsel then pointed out that there was an error in informing Mr. Stone of the 
maximum penalty possible. While he was told by the Court and counsel that the maximum 
penitentiary term possible was 25 years, in fact, it is 30 years. The Court suggested that it could 
remedy this by not sentencing Mr. Stone to over 25 years. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 28. 
The State argued in response that Mr. Stone's pleas were lmowing and voluntary. The 
State made no reference to the question of whether just cause would support withdrawal of the 
plea, nor whether it would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea. Tr. 1011 9/06 p. 31-32. 
Following this, the Court determined that the plea was voluntary and knowing and denied 
the motion. In its comments, the Court never mentioned the just cause standard, an analysis of 
Mr. Stone's motivation for attempting to withdraw the pleas, nor what, if any, prejudice 
withdrawal might mean for the State. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 34. In its written order on the motion, the 
Court stated only: "After argument, the Court DENIED the Motion and proceeded to 
sentencing." CR Vol. UI 523. 
Officer Ballard and Officer Hill both testified in the sentencing portion of the 
proceedings. Both asked for heavy sentences. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 42-47. The State and the defense 
both asked for a term of 15 years with 7.5 fixed. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 45,47. 
Mr. Stone had a prior record which began with juvenile matters. The most significant 
priors included an aggravated battery and attempted robbery which resulted in a 15-year Idaho 
sentence imposed in 1984 and a kidnaping which resulted in a 10.5 year Arizona sentence 
imposed in 1995. PSI p. 8-9. While in prison, Mr. Stone had many DORs. PSI p. 23. 
Additionally, Mr. Stone absconded from parole in 1993. However, he turned himself into 
Binghanl County in 2004, and was returned to prison. Within just six months, after it was 
established that Mr. Stone had been in no trouble since 1993, he was placed on parole and 
discharged that same day. Mr. Stone was placed on parole in Arizona in 2004. When he failed 
to report for supervision, a warrant was issued and he served time on the Arizona charge while in 
the Bingham jail awaiting sentencing in this case. PSI p. 11-15. 
Mr. Stone is Native American and grew up mostly in the Fort Iiall area. His family was 
poor and his father was alcoholic and sniffed paint. His parents divorced when he was very 
young and for a time he and his siblings lived with grandparents. Mr. Stone was in special 
education and ultimately unable to complete high school. An evaluatioil done in Arizona states 
that Mr. Stone is limited by low intelligence (IQ 85), functioning in some areas in the mentally 
retarded range. PSI p. 16, 19,38, 39. 
When he returned to Idaho in 2004, Mr. Stone paid the Native American Consulting 
Services and Management Company to help him get his life in order. He began self- 
employment, buying and remodeling trailer homes. PSI p. 19. 
Also, while in prison, Mr. Stone worked with a psychologist and made progress in 
understanding his anger and the reasons for it and began efforts to gain rational control over it. 
PSI p. 20. 
Mr. Stone started drinking regularly at age 13 and, according to a prior PSI, is only sober 
while incarcerated. However, he did undergo alcoholism treatment at Orofino and was given a 
guarded prognosis. He also has used a variety of other drugs. However, when he was paroled in 
Idaho, he entered the Fort Hall Treatment program and did well until he left the program without 
permission. PSI p. 21. 
The defense argued in favor of the 15-year sentence with 7.5 fixed because such a term 
would provide time for Mr. Stone to participate in rehabilitative programs in prison and give him 
a chance to change his life. Tr. 10119/06 p. 48. The defense also pointed out that under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Stone had reason to believe he and the others in the trailer were 
being shot at, had reason to fear a man named Jose who had threatened such action, and was 
acting to protect himself and the others. Additionally, there was some evidence that the officers 
had actually shot each other rather than being shot by Mr. Stone. Tr. 10119106 p. 49-52. 
Additionally, as the defense pointed out, when Mr. Stone was released from prison and 
returned to Idaho, he undertook self-employment and engaged in positive activities for the 
community, buying rundown trailers and fixing thein up. Tr. 10119106 p. 52-53. 
Mr. Stone was disadvantaged by his childhood when he learned violent behavior from his 
father. Despite this bad beginning, he did, according to counsel, compete his GED in prison and 
had begun looking into Christianity as a means of help in turning his life around. Moreover, he 
had developed goals for his life, including becoming a mentor to young people to warn them off 
of the path he took. To that end, he had entered on his own, using his own funds, rehabilitation 
programs when he was released from prison. Tr. 10/19106 p. 54-56. 
The Court, citing protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment 
imposed a sentence of five years fixed on the firearm charge followed by 25 years with 20 fixed 
on the battexy charge. Tr. 10/19/06 p. 71-76. 
A notice of appeal was subsequently filed. CR Vol. III 528. 
Mr. Stone then filed apro  se Criminal Rule 35 motion, seeking both correction of an 
illegal sentence and reduction of his sentence. CR Vol. IV 553. This was followed shortly 
thereafter by apvo se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been 
ineffective in not filing a timely notice of appeal and that his appeal had therefore been dismissed 
without review on the merits. CR Vol. IV 678. 
In response, trial counsel's motion to withdraw was granted and new counsel appointed. 
CR Vol. I V  690. New counsel represented Mr. Stone in a hearing on his Rule 35 motion. 
Counsel stated that while Mr. Stone's motion appeared to he seeking a new sentencing hearing, 
counsel did not believe that could he achieved through the Rule 35 and instead asked the Court to 
consider new material Mr. Stone offered as a basis for leniency and a reduction in the sentence. 
The Court concurred that the Rule 35 was not a proper vehicle to obtain a new sentencing 
hearing and then denied the motion without further explanation other tl~an saying that the 
sentence was appropriate. Tr. 6/18/07 p. 78-81, CR Vol. IV 694. 
About a month later, a hearing was held on the post-conviction petition. At the close of 
that hearing, the Court granted relief allowing Mr. Stone to refile his appeal. CR Vol. N 697. 
Mr. Stone refiled the notice of appeal raising the issues of whether the District Court 
erred in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and whether the sentence was excessive 
CR Vol. I V  697,699, 733. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying the incorrect legal standard to 
the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas? 
B. Did the District Court err in finding that Mr. Stone's guilty pleas were knowing and 
voluntary given that they were entered without lalowledge of the defenses being waived? 
C. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea given that 
Mr. Stone had demonstrated just cause to grant the motion, his motivation for the motion was not 
simply to avoid a negative presentence report but rather to withdraw pleas entered in ignorance of 
several potential viabledefenses, and there was no allegation that the State would be prejudiced 
by the withdrawal? 
D. Did the District Courl e n  in imposing an excessive sentence? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Applying the Incorrect Standard in Deciding the 
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas. 
h deciding the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, the District Court considered only 
whether Mr. Stone's pleas were knowing and voluntary. The Court did not consider whether 
there was just cause to support withdrawal of the pleas, whether Mr. Stone's motivation for 
moving to withdraw the pleas militated for or against granting the motion, nor whether the State 
would be prejudiced if the motion was granted. In failing to consider just cause, Mr. Stone's 
motivation, and the lack of prejudice to the State, the District Court abused its discretion 
Denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Litz, 122 Idaho 387,388,834 P.2d 904,905 (Ct. App. 1992). When a defendant seeks to 
withdraw a guilty plea, the first question is whether the plea was constitutionally valid. If not, 
withdrawal should be granted. If the plea was constitutionally valid, the second question is 
whether withdrawal should nevertheless be allowed as a matter of discretion. State v. Dopp, 124 
Idaho 512, 516, 861 P.2d 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. State, 118 Idaho 842, 844, 801 P.2d 
49,5 1 (Ct. App. 1990). If a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of the plea, the 
motion should be granted uilless the State demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v, 
Ballavd, 114 Idaho 799, 802, 761 P.2d 1151, 11 53 (1988), citing State v. Hendevson, 113 Idaho 
41 1, 744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987) ("In granting or denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
before sentencing has occurred, the district court is empowered with broad discretion, liberal 
exercise of which is encouraged." 113 Idaho at 414,744 P.2d at 798 (citations omitted).) A 
motion made after sentencing may be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. ICR 33 (c); 
State v. Ballavd, 114 Idaho 799, 801,761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988). When a motion to withdraw a 
plea is made before sentencing, but after the defendant has seen the PSI or received other 
information about the probable sentence, the District Court may temper its liberality by weighing 
the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008). 
In reviewing a District Court decision for an abuse of discretion, "the appellate court 
coilducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Ifanslovan, - 
Idaho -, -P.3d - 2008 WL 2512529 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
In this case, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to act "within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it." Id. In particular, the District Court considered only whether Mr. Stone's 
pleas were constitutionally valid insofar as they were knowingly and voluntarily entered. As the 
Court stated: 
Court: What's the standard of review? 
Mr. Reynolds [defense counsel]: I would believe it would probably be deference 
to the Court's taking of the plea. I think that probably would be based on the fact 
that the Court was present to observe the defendant's demeanor, his responses, to 
inquire of counsel, to perceive counsel's demeanor, the State's representative, its 
demeanor, to take and made an assessment based on the information presented at 
Court: And determine whether someone, based on all the facts, all the situation as 
it existed at the point, made a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Mr. Reynolds: I understand, your Honor. 
Court: Asking the defendant all of the questions necessary to make sure about that 
and making sure that that's where the defendant was. 
Tr. 10119/06 p. 23. 
The District Court did not go on to determine whether either a just cause supported 
withdrawal, whether Mr. Stone's motivation for withdrawal militated for or against granting the 
motion, nor whether the State would suffer any prejudice if the motion was granted 
Because the District Court did not apply the proper standard to the decision before it, the 
order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed and the matter remanded. 
B. The District Court Erred i~z Finding that the Guilty Pleas Were Knowing and 
Voluntary Given the Pleas Were Entered Without Knowledge of the Defenses 
Being Waived. 
The order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed because the 
District Court abused its discretion in not applying the correct legal standard. The order must also 
be reversed because the District Court erred in finding the pleas were knowing and voluntary. 
The first step in deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine whether the 
plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. State v. Dopp, supra. In this case, the District Court 
erred in finding that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily, given that the pleas were 
entered based upon false and i~lcomplete information provided by defense counsel and without 
knowledge of the potential defenses being waived thereby. 
The determination that a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly involves a 
three-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that 
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront 
his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the 
defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 
Idaho 32, 34,557 P.2d 626,628 (1976). On appeal, voluntariness of the guilty plea 
and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record as a whole. State v. 
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,300,787 P.2d 281,286 (1990) (citing State v. Peterson, 
98 Idaho 706,571 P.2d 767 (1977)). 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 515, 861 P.2d at 84. 
New counsel's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas cited 21 bases for withdrawal of the 
guilty pleas. Several of those go to demonstrate that the pleas were not knowing and voluntary 
because in making the pleas, Mr. Stone did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to a 
jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself. Id. The waiver was 
not knowing and intelligent because Mr. Stone made the waiver without having been informed of 
the potential defenses in the case. 
In particular, the motion states that prior counsel did not fully investigate the possibility of 
basing a defense upon the fact that Mr. Stone did not lrnow that the men deploying flash grenades 
in his trailer and then entering with guns were police. Nor did coullsel infonn Mr. Stone of this 
potential defense. As noted in the motion to withdraw, one of the elements of aggravated battery 
upon a law enforcement officer is that the defendant either knows or has reason to know of the 
victim's status. I.C. 3 18-915, CR Vol. 111 516. 
According to the Law Enforcement and Corrections Techi~ology Center, the flash of light 
from a flash bang grenade is like "looking directly into the sun" and the simultai~eous bang 
reaches "a painful 170 decibels." "If you are the target, it would be pretty temfying. You 
probably will think you are going to be incinerated," according to Greg MacAleese, president and 
CEO of Law Enforcemnem~t Technologies (LET). "The whole idea is to simultaneously attack most 
of your senses" and disorient the target. National hstitute of Justice, TECHbeat, "A Big Bang and 
Flash With LTL" Summer 2003. Accordingly, if Mr. Stone did not know and did not have reason 
to know that the armed men setting off explosives in the trailer in the middle of the night in the 
presence of a baby and a three-year-old were police, he could not be guilty of aggravated battery 
upon a law enforcement officer. 
Likewise, prior counsel did not fully investigate nor inform Mr. Stone of the possibility of 
raising a claim of self-defense. There was evidence that Mr. Stone reasonably believed he was 
under armed attack by Jose Speedy who had previously threatened to shoot and kill Mr. Stone's 
companion, Maria Villa, in front of her children. Given that reasonable belief, Mr. Stone would 
have been legally allowed to protect himself, Maria, and the children, as well as his home, from 
armed intruders. LC. $ 5  19-201 et seq., CR Vol. 111 5 17. 
Likewise, prior counsel did not investigate nor infonn Mr. Stone of potential defenses 
based upon ballistics analyses. CR Vol. 111 5 18. Prior counsel also did not investigate nor inform 
Mr. Stone of potential defenses based upon the fact that all the police officers involved in this 
case were represented by a single attorney and that this created a potential for collusion among the 
officers to establish Mr. Stone's guilt. CR Vol. III 519. 
Prior counsel also failed to inform Mr. Stone of potential defenses based upon resistance 
to illegal police action in obtaining and serving the warrant by improper means. See State v. 
Wilkevson, 114 Idaho 174, 178, 755 P.2d 471,476 (Ct. App. 1988), noting the inodem trend 
permitting forceful resistance to an arrest when excessive force is used by the officer. Contrast 
this case with State v. Lusby - Idaho , P.3d -, 2008 WL 2278074 (Ct. App. 2008), 
wherein the Court noted that "an individual may not use force to resist apeaceable arrest by one 
she knows or has good reason to believe is a police officer, even if the arrest is illegal under the 
circumstances." In this case, a peaceful arrest was not being conducted. Rather an entire team of 
heavily armed officers were detonating explosive diversionary devices and carrying and using 
deadly weapons inside a home occupied by an infant and a three-year-old. Further, there was a 
serious question about whether the police announced their prescncc prior to setting off the 
grenades (an unlikely event given that the police Search Warrant Application sought and received 
a "no-knock service warrant for officer safety purposes") or if Mr. Stone could even have heard a 
later announcement (if that occurred) given the aural assault to which he had just been subjected. 
Because counsel did not investigate these potential defenses nor discuss them in any way 
with Mr. Stone, he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived them. He could not have 
entered a knowing and voluntary plea. The District Court's finding to the contrary was erroneous 
and the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea must now be reversed 
C .  The District Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Pleas as the 
Motion met the Just Cause Standard Even Taking into Account the Motivation 
for the Motion. 
As set out above, the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must he 
reversed both because the District Court abused its discretion in applying the incorrect standard to 
the motion and because the District Court erred in finding that the pleas were knowing and 
voluntary. In addition, the District Court erred in denying the motion to withdraw the pleas 
because the motion met the just cause standard, even taking into account Mr. Stone's motivation 
for filing the motion. 
As set out above, if a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of a plea, the 
motion should be granted unless the State demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v. 
Ballard, suka.  When a motion to withdraw a plea is made before sentencing, but after the 
defendant has seen the PSI or received other information about the probable sentence, the District 
Court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Arthur, 
supra. Nevertheless, when a just reason to withdraw the plea is presented, relief should be 
granted absent a strong showing of prejudice by the State. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411, 
816 P.2d 364,366 (Ct. App. 1991). 
In this case, just cause was established to withdraw the plea. Just cause existed both 
because Mr. Stone had not been properly informed by counsel of the potential defenses to the 
charges and because Mr. Stone had not been properly advised regarding the maximuin penalty. 
In these ways, this case is like State v. Johnson, supra. In Johnson, the State had failed to 
provide exculpatory and material reports which could have been used to mount a defense to the 
charge, and Johnson was wrongly advised of the maximum penalty. The Court of Appeals 
determined that these circumstances amounted to just cause to withdraw the plea. Even when the 
Court considered Johnson's motivation for withdrawal, as the motion to withdraw was not made 
until after he had seen the presentence report, the Court found that the lower court should have 
granted the motion to withdraw. 
In this case, the potential exculpatory and material infonnatioii that could have been used 
to raise a defense to the charges was not hidden from Mr. Stone by the State. Rather, it was 
hidden from him by his attorneys' failure to investigate the potentially exculpatory material and to 
inform Mr. Stone of the material's existence and significance. Just as in Johnson, Mr. Stone's 
ignorance of the potential defenses he was waiving when he entered his pleas, along with the 
misinformation about the penalties he was facing, constitutes a just cause for withdrawal of the 
pleas. 
And, just as in Johnson, the State did not offer any reasons why prejudice would result if 
the motion to withdraw the plea was granted. And, while a finding of prejudice is not necessary 
for rejection of a motion to withdraw a plea, the lack of prejudice weighs in favor of granting the 
motion. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho at 370, 816 P.2d at 414, citing State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 
801-02, 761 P:2d at 1153-54 n. 2 (1988). 
And, last, the conclusion that the motion to withdraw the plea should have been granted 
remains standing even when Mr. Stone's motivation for the motion is considered. As noted 
above, because Mr. Stone's motion was made after the presentence report had been prepared, the 
Court was allowed to consider the motivation for withdrawal. State v. Johnson, supra. Where the 
motion is made simply to avoid the consequences of a negative presentence report, it might be that 
a court could properly deny the motion. Id. But, in this case, as in Johnson, the motivation was 
not avoidance of the presentence report. The Court had repeatedly told Mr. Stone prior to entry of 
his plea that it was not going to be bound by the State's sentencing request. In the Court's own 
description of Mr. Stone's state of knowledge at the time the plea was entered, "[Ilt's absolutely 
clear to me he knew he could get 30 years. . . . Even though the State's going to recommend 7 and 
a half and 7 and a half, I'm not bound to that. You know that. You could get 30. Yeah I know 
that." Tr. 10119106 p. 24-25. Mr. Stone's motivation for withdrawal of his plea could not have 
been the desire to avoid the consequences of the presentence report. He had been told by the 
Court itself well before the plea was even entered that the Court intended to impose a severe 
sentence much greater than the sentence recommended by the State. 
Rather, the only obvious motivation for Mr. Stone's motion is his discovery that he had 
defenses to the charges which had never been investigated nor explained to him. Just as the 
Johnson Court found that, even considering the defendant's motivation, withdrawal should have 
been allowed, in this case also, even considering Mr. Stone's motivation, withdrawal should have 
been allowed. 
In summary, just cause existed to support withdrawal of the pleas because Mr. Stone made 
the pleas without having had his defenses explained or investigated. He was for all intents and 
purposes in the same position as a defendant who has had exculpatory evidence withheld by the 
State. Just as in Johnson where withdrawal was held proper, withdrawal is proper here. 
Therefore, the District Court order denying the motion should now be reversed. 
D. The District Court Erred in Imposiizg an Excessive Sentence. 
As discussed above, the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas should be 
reversed and the matter reinai~ded for further proceedings. In the alternative, the order imposing 
sentence should be reversed as the sentence was excessive. 
On appeal, a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Izaguirre, - Idaho 
-, - P.3d -, 2008 WL 802823,3 (Ct. App. 2008) review denied (2008); State v. Brown, 
121 Idaho 385,393, 825 P.2d 482,490 (1992). A sentence is only reasonable insofar as it 
satisfies the goals of protection of society, deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of the offender, and 
retribution. Id In reviewing a sentence, the appellate court makes an independent review of the 
record, focusing on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Izaguirre, 
supra, State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 51 1, 808 P.2d 429,230 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Ln this case, the State recommended a total term of 15 years with 7.5 years fixed. 
However, the District Court rejected this recommendation and imposed five years fixed on the 
firearm charge, followed by 25 years on the aggravated battery with 20 of those years fixed. This 
fixed term of 25 years exceeds the state's recommendation by 333%. And, given Mr. Stone's age 
of 42 at the time of sentencing, this is a functional life sentence as he will not be eligible for 
parole until he is 67 years old and he will not complete his sentence until age 72. 
According to a recent study by faculty members of the Harvard University School of 
Public Health, among others, a Native American Male bom in 1982 has a life expectancy of only 
62 years. Murray CJL, Kulkami SC, Michaud C, Tomijima N, Bulzacchelli MT, et al. (2006), 
Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities across Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in 
the United States, PLoS Med 3(9) (2006). (Mr. Stone was born in 1964, but the public health 
study cited only looked at data from 1982 on.) Given this expectancy, Mr. Stone's parole 
eligibility date will not arrive until some 5 years afier his death. (This is even assuming that life 
in prison, with its attendant stresses, laclc of good nutrition, inadequate medical care and exposure 
to life-shortening diseases, will not further reduce Mr. Stone's life expectancy.) 
Because the fixed term exceeds Mr. Stone's expected life span, it is relevant to consider 
the case law on fixed life terms: 
Under these r~oohilP1 standards, a fixed life sentence may be deemed reasonable if 
the offense is  so egregious that it demands an exceptionaliy severe measure of 
retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative uotential 
that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting society. 
[A] fixed life term, with its rigid preclusion of parole or good time, should be 
regarded as a sentence requiring a high degree of certainty-certainly that the nature 
State v. Toohill, supra. 
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of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty 
that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released. 
State v. Eubanic, 114 Idaho 635,638, 759 P.2d 926,929 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Li, 131 Idaho 
126, 129,952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App.1998). The Eubankrule applies both to fixed-life 
sentences and fixed-term sentences which cause the defendant to "effectively spend the rest of his 
life in prison." State v. Bello, 135 Idaho 442,444, 19 P.3d 66,68 (Ct. App. 2001). 
I11 this case, the sentence was not reasonable because the offense, given the totality of the 
circumsta~~ces, did not demand an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence and 
because Mr. Stone is not so utterly lacking in rehabilitative potential so as to make imprisonment 
until death the only feasible means of protecting society. 
While Mr. Stone does have a significant prior record, there are at least two equally 
significant factors which militate toward leniency. 
First, Mr. Stone's life circumstances put him at a serious disadvantage. He was born into a 
family that was marred by his father's alcoholis~n and paint sniffing, a family where he was taught 
to be violent and a family that ultimately broke into pieces. He was not well-educated and he had 
to struggle with the challenge of having a low IQ. He did not have the stability and safe 
environment where he could have learned how to be a productive, healthy, law abiding person. 
And, layered on top of this were his own drug and alcohol problems. Yet, he was attempting to 
better himself. Mr. Stone had turned to tribal services to get his life in order. He had started his 
own business rehabilitating trailers. He had attempted to get on the right track. 
Second, the events that lead to the battery alleged in this case were created in large part by 
the actions of the police department in moving in on the trailer in a violent manner at a time when 
Mr. Stone did not know what was happening and was inside with small children and a woman 
whom he believed was going to be the target of a shooting. This was not a situation where Mr. 
Stone sought out someone to attack nor a situation wherein he was the initial aggressor. When 
looking at the four goals of sentencing, it becomes evident that the sentence imposed was 
unreasoilable. The sentence exceeded that needed for the protection of society. Mr. Stone was 
turning his life around. It is not at all clear that he will not be safe for release prior to the end of 
the 25 years he must now serve before he is parole eligible. The sentence also exceeded that 
needed for purposes of deterrence. While the charged offenses were certaiilly very serious, there 
were unique circun~stances. Given those unique circumstances, a 25 year fixed term is not 
necessary to deter either Mr. Stone nor others from similar criminal activity. The sentence also 
exceeded that needed for purposes of rehabilitation. Whatever programming is available to Mr. 
Stone in prison for rehabilitative purposes will surely take less than 25 years to complete. And, 
finally, the sentence exceeded that appropriate for retribution. Again, while the charged offenses 
are certainly very serious, given the unique circumstances involved, a 25 year fixed term, followed 
by another five years indeterminate, exceeds any amount that could fairly be said to serve the 
purpose of retribution. 
For these reasons, if the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas is not 
reversed, the order imposing sentence should be reversed and the matter remanded for 
resentencing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Stone requests that the order denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas be reversed and the matter remanded for further appropriate 
proceedings. In the alternative, Mr. Stone requests that the order imposing sentence be reversed 
and the matter remanded for resentencing. 
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